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ABSTRACT
As  well  as  providing  an  analysis  of  how  financial  stability  could  be  sustained  through  the 
appropriate targeting of policy instruments at debt gearing, this paper aims to provide an overview 
of the respective roles which governments and shareholders could assume in deterring financial 
institutions from overly relying on certain policy measures (role of governments) and in reducing 
tax  burdens  on  tax  payers  (role  of  shareholders).  The  duration  of  the  recent  Crisis  has  also 
witnessed the introduction of mechanisms aimed at bailing- in financial institutions – rather than 
merely bailing them out.
Even though monetary policy measures should ultimately be targeted at macro level, the respective 
roles assumed by governments and shareholders at micro level in facilitating the phasing out of 
certain  monetary  policy  measures  and  assuming  responsibility  as the  first  resort  during  the 
impending collapse of a financial institution, are also of vital importance. This paper also aims to 
consider additional measures which could be implemented as a means of mitigating the number of 
financial  instititions  which  could  become  overly  dependent  on  monetary  policy  and  liquidity 
sustenance measures provided during deteriorating financial conditions. Greater focus on strategies 
aimed at  mitigating the number of  financial  institutions  which could become overly dependent 
(bail-in strategies which could address bail outs) – rather than simply focussing on measures and 
exit strategies aimed at weaning such institutions after assistance has been granted to these financial 
institutions, could prove to be more effective.
A brief comparative analysis of the monetary policy response implemented in the Euro area during 
the recent Financial Crisis (against that which was implemented in the United States), will also be 
provided in this paper.
Key Words:  monetary policy,  central  banks,  financial  crises,  bail  in,  bail  outs,  liquidity,  ECB, 
Federal Reserve, interest rates, regulation, stability, capital, Basel III
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Introduction
Whilst central banks have assumed more prominent, extended and innovative roles since the onset 
of the recent Financial Crisis, the importance of the respective roles assumed by shareholders and 
governments in relation to the recapitalisation of financial institutions and the facilitation of exit 
strategies (particularly exit strategies from non standard policy measures), have also been brought to 
light.
According to Weber, the monetary policy response of the Eurozone, when compared to that of the 
United States, is principally attributed to the following factors:2
i) In contrast to the U.S financial system, banks play a dominant role in funding euro area non 
financial  corporations  – hence the  explanation to  why the Eurosystem's  response  to  the 
Crisis has focussed on measures aimed at enabling liquidity-constrained banks to mitigate 
their short term funding gaps (eventually sustaining the ability of the banking sector to lend 
to the real economy) - „the enhanced credit support approach“.3
ii) In comparison to the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England, outright asset purchases have 
played just a minor role in the European Central Bank (ECB) Governing Council's Strategy.
How can governments act to wean off financial institutions, who despite improved financial market 
conditions,  continue  to  depend  on  the  policy  measures  offered  as  a  means  of  sustaining  such 
institutions during deteriorating periods? Whilst the implementation of certain exit strategies – as 
well as additional measures which support these exit strategies have been advocated, mechanisms 
which are aimed at bailing in such institutions rather than simply bailing them out, appear to be a 
more effective means in mitigating the number of financial institutions which could become overly 
independent on support measures provided during periods of financial crises.
The  first  section  of  this  paper  (which  ensues  after  the  introductory  section)  will  consider 
developments in the Eurozone which culminated in the the introduction of the full allotment policy 
which  „allowed  banks  to  accumulate  substantial  amounts  of  surplus  liquidity“.  Section  two, 
thereafter, will consider how governments could act to wean off financial institutions from the full 
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2 Keynote speech by Axel A Weber, President of the Deutsche Bundesbank at the Shadow Open Market Committee 
(SOMC) Symposium, New York City, 12 October 2010 „Monetary Policy After the Crisis: A European Perspective“ 
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allotment policy (mechanisms aimed at addressing bail outs) as well as policies and mechanisms 
which could be implemented by governments to mitigate situations whereby financial institutions, 
who despite improved financial market conditions, continue to depend on the full allotment policy 
(the bail-in strategic aspect). This aspect will also incorporate the role of shareholders as the first 
resort during the impending collapse of a financial institution. The third section will then provide a 
brief analysis of the policy response measures adopted in the U.S during the recent Financial Crisis 
before a conclusion is drawn.
A. The Eurozone: From the Variable Rate Tender to Full Allotment.
The liquidity needs of the banking system in the Euro area, it is stated4, are principally attributable 
to non banks' demands for bank notes and substantial remunerated reserve requirements.
Factors which culminated in the introduction of the full allotment policy which „allowed banks to 
accumulate substantial amounts of surplus liquidity – which could be lent to other banks or placed 
in the Eurosystem's deposit facility (an overnight facility used to deposit excess reserves)“ are as 
follows:5
− Prior to October 2008, refinancing operations were conducted as variable rate tenders, with 
allotment amounts closely aligned with the aggregate liquidity needs of the banking system.
− In October 2008, however, the variable rate tender procedure with benchmark allotment was 
replaced with a fixed rate full allotment procedure – as a means of facilitating and sustaining 
banks' liquidity operations (despite the restrictions in flow of liquidity – resulting from the 
aftermath of Lehman's collapse).
B. How Can Governments Wean Off Financial Institutions from Overly Depending on the Full 
Allotment Policy (post grant of support measures)? Further How Could Governments also Act to 
Mitigate  Situations  whereby  Financial  Institutions,  Who  Despite  Improved  Financial  Market 
Conditions, Continue to Depend on the Full Allotment Policy (pre grant of support measures)?
The most obvious solution relating to the weaning off of financial institutions would appear to be 
the  introduction  of  exit  strategies  which  would  compel  overly  reliant  financial  institutions  to 
withdraw from such allotment policies. Incentives which could serve in encouraging such financial 
institutions to withdraw from such policies, could accompany such exit strategies in the form of 
lower interest rate deals and packages to be offered to financial institutions – the level of such 
interest  rates  being  dependent  on  the  length  of  period  during  which  such  financial  institutions 
applied for such liquidity assistance (that is, the degree to which interests rates are reduced for such 
institutions will increase proportionately to how quickly such institutions withdraw from continued 
dependence on liquidity assistance and other policies implemented to assist them during periods of 
financial difficulties).
The Recapitalisation Communication also states that „in facilitating exit strategies, member States 
may also consider using a restrictive dividend policy to ensure the temporary character of State 
intervention.“6
4 „In the Euro area, the bulk of liquidity is provided via the collateralized lending of different maturities – the main 
refinancing operation, the one week operation, being the most important.“ See ibid at page 3
5 See ibid
6 See paragraph 32 of the Recapitalisation Communication (Communication from the Commission — The 
recapitalisation of financial institutions in the current financial crisis: limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and 
In relation to the mitigation of situations whereby financial institutions - who despite improved 
financial  market  conditions,  continue to depend on the full  allotment policy,  the satisfaction of 
stipulated criteria and requirements relating to the level and quality of capital (for purposes aimed at 
ensuring loss absorbency) should serve as a pre requisite before such full allotment policies are 
granted  to  financial  institutions  who  apply  for  these.  The  loss  absorbency  of  capital  will  be 
approached under the headings below:
“Conversion/Write offs” 
Whereby debt  instruments  are  transferred into “higher  quality and common equity capital  with 
better  loss  absorption  characteristics  –  with  the  result  that  the  institution’s  ability to  withstand 
further losses is consolidated.”7
- Debt regarded as bank capital should be converted to stock or written off in a crisis – hence 
compelling bond investors to bear some of the cost of future bail outs.8
- All regulatory capital instruments sold by banks should be capable of absorbing losses if the 
company is unable to fund itself – before taxpayers’ cash is plundered into rescuing a lender, 
so-called contingent capital should be converted into equity or written off.9
Benefits of the Basel Committee’s Proposals which are aimed at “ensuring the loss absorbency of 
regulatory capital at the point of non viability” include
- The discouragement excessive risk taking (since investors will not be encouraged to buy 
securities under the assumption that they will avoid losses in the event of a bank failure).
- The reduction of the need for government bailouts owing to the requirement that contingent 
capital be converted (to equity or written off) to fund rescues rather than taxpayers solely 
bearing the cost. Hence bond investors of a bank will serve as the first resort during the 
impending collapse of a bank.
Two  mechanisms  which  are  considered  to  be  instrumental  in  the  achievement  of  the  goal  of 
managing failing financial institutions – as well as the re capitalisation of institutions (without the 
need for capital support from governments and tax payers have been proposed:10
- 1) The Bail In Mechanism : Whose implementation commences when a firm reaches a pre-
defined  trigger  –  which  would  re-capitalise  a  firm  as  a  going  concern  (through  the 
conversion of selected levels of unsecured debt to common equity). Since no shareholder or 
creditor consultation is considered to be necessary, a swift implementation of its operation is 
expected.
- 2)  Contingent  Capital:  Whose  implementation  has  been  undertaken  historically  by  the 
insurance sector and which serves as a provision for one-time losses. It is issued in the form 
of notes which are convertible into equity as soon as a pre-defined trigger is attained by the 
issuer.  Since  it  requires  no  regulatory  involvement,  transparency  is  enhanced  –  such 
safeguards against undue distortions of competition )
7  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document “Proposal to Ensure the Loss Absorbency of 
Regulatory  Capital  at  the  Point  of  Non  Viability”  August  2010  at  page  13  (page  19  of  20)  < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs174.pdf?noframes=1>
8  “Basel Committee Says Bank Bond Investors Should Help Fund Future Bailouts” 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-19/basel-committee-says-bank-bond-investors-should-help-bear-cost-
of-bailouts.html>
9  ibid
10 See Association for Financial Markets in Europe, “AFME Outlines Ways To Rescue Failing Banks Without Tax 
Payer Financing” http://www.afme.eu/AFME/Home/sifi%20pr.pdf at page 1 of 2
transparency serving as a potential means in helping to prevent localised problems from 
triggering into a full blown systemic crisis.”
„Because hedge funds have so much lower gearing, or leverage than banks, they have been able to 
absorb much bigger falls in asset values.“11
According to Miles,12 the short term nominal interest rate is a very blunt instrument to implement in 
attempting  to  limit  the  gearing  of  financial  institutions.  Furthermore,  he  argues  that  capital 
requirments, and explicit limits on gearing constitute more direct means of controlling leverage.13
Financial stability, in his opinion, could be preserved by directing policy instruments at debt gearing 
(or leverage) – and that with banks, „this could be achieved through a prevention in the initial 
(limited) fall in the value of assets and by ensuring that banks are able to withstand falls in asset 
values through sufficient loss absorbing capital – rather than expecting monetary policy (changes in 
interest rates) to substantially reduce asset price variability. He thereby, not only justifies his support 
for Basel III, but also thinks that time varying limits on gearing of financial firms (limits which 
could  vary  with  asset  prices  and  with  the  economic  cycle)  will  contribute  towards  helping  to 
maintain financial stability.14 The Basel Committee also proposes the introduction of non risk based 
leverage ratios as supplementary measures to the Basel risk based framework.15
C. Monetary Policy Measures Implemented in the United States
Measures which have been taken by the Federal Reserve since the most recent Financial Crisis 
made its debut, include the following :16
− The terms on which lending was provided to depository institutions (traditional borrowers) 
were eased quite dramatically. 
− This was followed by the lowering of interest rate on discount window loans, an increase in 
their maturity, and, auctioned credit (aimed at reducing the stigma of borrowing from the 
window). 
− Cooperative measures with foreign central banks through currency swaps (to make dollar 
funding available to banks operating abroad) also took place.
11 See D Miles, „Leverage and Monetary Policy“, Speech by David Miles, Member of the Monetary Policy Committee 
of the Bank of England at the Economic and Social Research Institute Foundation for Fiscal Studies, 12 October 
2010 at page 9 <http://www.bis.org/review/r101018e.pdf>
12 ibid
13He however concedes that “simply because they are a more direct means to control leverage does not prove that 
capital  requirements or limits to gearing are a far more effective tool  to preserve financial  stability than changing 
interest rates.” He also provides at least two situations where the use of capital controls and limits on gearing might not 
be a very effective means of maintaining financial stability; ibid.
14 ibid
15 See G Tumpel-Gugerell, „The Interplay of Banking, Financial Intermediation and Regulation.“at the 13th 
Conference of the European Central Bank–Center for Financial Studies (ECB–CFS) Research Network on “Macro-
prudential Regulation as an Approach to Contain Systemic Risk: Economic Foundations, Diagnostic Tools and 
Policy Instruments”, Frankfurt am Main, 27 September 2010 at page 3 <http://www.bis.org/review/r100929e.pdf>
16 See D Kohn, „Monetary Policy in the Financial Crisis“ Federal Reserve Board Publications April 2009 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kohn20090418a.htm>
The provision of extraordinary measures was also illustrated by the fact that for the first time since 
the 1930s, credit was extended to non depository institutions – as well as the grant of discount 
window access  to  primary  dealers  when  it  became  evident  that  constraints  on  their  access  to 
liquidity threatened broader financial stability and economic activity.17
D. Conclusion
The improvement of the quality and quantity of capital – both on a going and gone concern basis, as 
a  means  of  improving  loss  absorbing  characteristics,  would  not  only  reduce  the  potential  for 
financial institutions to take excessive risks, reduce tax burdens on tax payers, it would also serve as 
an effective complement to monetary policy inititatives in preventing the fall in the value of assets.
Incentives  which could  serve in  encouraging such financial  institutions  to  withdraw from such 
policies, could accompany such exit strategies in the form of lower interest rate deals and packages 
to be offered to financial institutions – the level of such interest rates being dependent on the length 
of period during which such financial institutions applied for such liquidity assistance.
As the recent Crisis has demonstrated, systemic risks are closly linked to liquidity risks – hence 
maturity  transformations  and  liquidity  funding  constitute  important  factors  in  determining  the 
resilience of the financial system.
17An illustration in relation to last Autumn, is also provided by Kohn - when „a run on money market mutual funds was 
severely constricting their purchases of commercial paper, an important source of credit to many businesses.“ In this 
respect he adds that „the funds, their customers, and their borrowers were supported by making credit available – credit 
which allowed funds to meet heavy redemption requests and which also provided credit directly to borrowers in the 
commercial paper market.“ 
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